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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No,
14327

-vsTHEODORE LOPES,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with the crime of carrying
a concealed weapon, contrary to the provisions of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 1975).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A trial was held before the Honorable Peter F.
Leary, sitting without a jury, in the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.

Appellant was found guilty as charged and sentenced

according to law.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the
conviction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 1, 197 5, three officers of the vice
squad of the Salt Lake City Police Department observed
a "wanted" person.

The person, a known prostitute,

was riding on the passenger side of an automobile driven
by appellant east on Second South Street in Salt Lake.
After the officers pulled the car over (T.3), one
officer went to the prostitute's side and another went
to the driver's side of the vehicle (T.16/17).

While

the prositute was being placed in custody an officer
asked the driver, appellant in this case, for identification.

The officer then ran a routine warrant check

and found that appellant, the driver of the car, had
a warrant out for his arrest (T.4).

Appellant was

arrested and searched and a dangerous weapon found
tucked in the waistband of his pants (T.25) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE VERY LIMITED DETENTION OF APPELLANT IN
THIS CASE WAS ENTIRELY REASONABLE.
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Appellant alleges that his stop and detention
by the police in this case were illegal and thus that
the weapon discovered upon his person was a result of
an unconstitutional search and seizure.

Respondent

contends, on the other hand, that the stop of appellantfs
vehicle was perfectly legal, that appellant was detained
no longer than a minute or two while the passenger in
his car was arrested, and that the police had every legal
right to obtain additional information.

Respondent

submits that appellant's conviction should be affirmed.
There is no question but that the stop was legal
in the first place. Appellant was driving with a woman
who was a known prostitute (T.5).

The police had a warrant

for her arrest and so they stopped appellant's car in order
to arrest her (T.3,4).

Appellant cites a great deal of

authority on the restrictions placed on police in relation
to traffic stops. However, from the facts of this case,
it is apparant that this was not a traffic stop.

The

police stopped appellant's car to arrest a "wanted"
person.
Since the stop was perfectly legal, the next
question arises in relation to the fact that appellant
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was detained for a brief moment after the stop.

The

police asked appellant for identification and ran a
brief routine warrant check.

Appellant alleges that

although it is permissible to ask for identification,
the police had no right to further detain him after
he gave identification to them.
In a case almost identical to the present case,
the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that a very brief detention for the purpose of a record1 scheck was entirely
valid.

The case is Brymer v. State, 528 P.2d 1025

(Nev. 1974).

Brymer was the passenger in a car that

was driven by another.

The car had no license plates.

Police stopped the vehicle and while it was stopped
they decided to radio the station and run a record's
check on Brymer also.

The check came back positive

and Brymer was arrested.
The Supreme Court has said numerous times:
" . . . the reasonability
of a seizure depends on a balance
between the public interest and
the individual's right to personal
security free from arbitrary interference by law officers." Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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The public, on the one hand, has a great interest in
apprehending criminals.

This must be balanced against

appellant's right to be free from arbitrary interference.
However, in this case, there was no arbitrary interference.
This was not an instance where police pulled over an
individual randomly.

The officers stopped appellant

because he was transporting a known felon.
There is no question but that an officer could
have arrested appellant if the officer could have somehow
remembered all outstanding arrest warrants in Salt Lake
City, and that one was for appellant*

Since Salt Lake

is a large city, the police keep central records and
officers refer to the central storehouse of records.

It

is completely reasonable for the police to take one minute
and call to headquarters for information.
The Supreme Court of the United States has
held that the police can detain an individual in order
to "maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining
more information."
(1972).

Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143

See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 95

S.Ct. 2580 (1975).

In the Brignoni case, the Court also

said:
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"Because of the limited
nature of the intrusion, stops of
this sort [no search of vehicle
or occupants, visual inspection
limited to parts of vehicle that
can be seen from outside, brief
questions] may be justified on
facts that do not amount to the
probable cause required for an
arrest." 95 S.Ct. at 2580.
It is clear that the officers were within their
**.

rights in calling the station for more information.

When

the public's right to safety and protection is weighed
against the very brief moment that the radio message took,
it is obvious that appellant's conviction should be
affirmed.

Appellant was already stopped; he had to wait

anyway while the police arrested his companion.

The

officers would have been lax indeed if they had not taken
the time to make a quick call to the station.

Public

policy demands that they be allowed to do so.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's stop was perfectly legal since he
was driving with a known prostitute v/ith a warrant out for
her arrest.

It was entirely reasonable for the police

to take a moment and make a quick call to the station.
When that call revealed that appellant was wanted, his
arrest and search were completely valid.
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Appellant's conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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